Single Idea 4714

[catalogued under 3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 1. Truth]

Full Idea

Putnam replaces a correspondence theory of truth with an epistemic notion of truth - truth is idealized rational acceptability. The correspondence theory is committed to realism, but his allows ontological relativism.

Gist of Idea

Putnam's epistemic notion of truth replaces the realism of correspondence with ontological relativism

Source

report of Hilary Putnam (Reason, Truth and History [1981]) by Paul O'Grady - Relativism Ch.3

Book Reference

O'Grady,Paul: 'Relativism' [Acumen 2002], p.73


A Reaction

This seems to be part of a slide by Putnam away from realism towards pragmatism. As a robust and defiant realist, this always strikes me as the road to hell.