Single Idea 5268

[catalogued under 22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / d. Health]

Full Idea

One may argue that disreputable pleasures are not pleasant; they may be pleasant to persons of unhealthy disposition, just as things may seem sweet or bitter or white to persons with unhealthy taste or vision.

Gist of Idea

Disreputable pleasures are only pleasant to persons with diseased perception

Source

Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1173b20)

Book Reference

Aristotle: 'Ethics (Nicomachean)', ed/tr. ThomsonJ A K/TredennickH [Penguin 1976], p.317


A Reaction

Aristotle's analogy gives quite good support for what seems a rather implausible view. Bentham disagrees. It certainly seems odd to deny that a sadist is obtaining pleasure. Surely that is what we object to? Is pleasure a value?