Single Idea 5328

[catalogued under 15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 4. Other Minds / c. Knowing other minds]

Full Idea

In 1936 I combined a mentalistic analysis of the propositions in which one attributes experiences to oneself with a behaviouristic analysis of the propositions in which one attributes experiences to others.

Clarification

'Mentalistic' views refer to pure consciousness

Gist of Idea

Originally I combined a mentalistic view of introspection with a behaviouristic view of other minds

Source

A.J. Ayer (The Central Questions of Philosophy [1973], §VI.D)

Book Reference

Ayer,A.J.: 'The Central Questions of Philosophy' [Penguin 1976], p.126


A Reaction

He then criticises his view for inconsistency. Ryle preferred a behaviouristic account of introspection, but Ayer calls this 'ridiculous'. Ayer hunts for a compromise, but then settles for the right answer, which makes mentalism the 'best explanation'.