Single Idea 5342

[catalogued under 17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 3. Eliminativism]

Full Idea

One may be committed to the truth of physicalism without being committed to the claim that the essence of an experience is captured fully by a description of its neural realiser.

Gist of Idea

Physicalism doesn't deny that the essence of an experience is more than its neural realiser

Source

Owen Flanagan (The Problem of the Soul [2002], p. 90)

Book Reference

Flanagan,Owen: 'The Problem of the Soul' [Basic Books 2003], p.90


A Reaction

This is a reply to the Leibniz Mill question (idea 2109) about what is missing from a materialist view. Flanagan's point is that just as the essence of a panorama is the view from the hill, so the essence of consciousness requires you to be that brain.

Related Idea

Idea 2109 Increase a conscious machine to the size of a mill - you still won't see perceptions in it [Leibniz]