Single Idea 5346

[catalogued under 15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 3. Mental Causation]

Full Idea

In the seventeenth century the dominant idea that causation is collisionlike made mental causation almost impossible to envision.

Gist of Idea

In the 17th century a collisionlike view of causation made mental causation implausible

Source

Owen Flanagan (The Problem of the Soul [2002], p.136)

Book Reference

Flanagan,Owen: 'The Problem of the Soul' [Basic Books 2003], p.136


A Reaction

Interesting. This makes Descartes' interaction theory look rather bold, and Leibniz's and Malebranche's rejection of it understandable. Personally I still think of causation as collisionlike, except that the collisions are of very very tiny objects.