Single Idea 5518

[catalogued under 16. Persons / E. Rejecting the Self / 4. Denial of the Self]

Full Idea

It is quite uninteresting whether, with half its components replaced, I have the same audio system, and also whether I exist if half of my body were simultaneously replaced.

Gist of Idea

It doesn't matter whether I exist with half my components replaced (any more than an audio system)

Source

Derek Parfit (The Unimportance of Identity [1995], p.302)

Book Reference

'Personal Identity', ed/tr. Martin,R /Barresi,J [Blackwells 2003], p.302


A Reaction

It is impossible to deny this, if the part replaced is not the brain. My doubt about Parfit's thesis is that while I may not care whether some modified thing is still me, my lawyers and the police might be very concerned.