Single Idea 590

[catalogued under 9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 1. Unifying an Object / a. Intrinsic unification]

Full Idea

Things are numerically one in matter, formally one in their account, generically one in their pattern of predication [genos], and one by analogy if related to a further one.

Gist of Idea

Things are one numerically in matter, formally in their account, generically in predicates, and by analogy in relations

Source

Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 1016b30)

Book Reference

Aristotle: 'Metaphysics', ed/tr. Lawson-Tancred,Hugh [Penguin 1998], p.124


A Reaction

Very subtle distinctions. What I like is that the notion of numerical unity is comprehensively tied to the notion of individual identity. 'To be is to be countable' may be wrong, but it is better than Quine's 'to be is to be the value of a variable'