Single Idea 6051

[catalogued under 5. Theory of Logic / D. Assumptions for Logic / 4. Identity in Logic]

Full Idea

If we say 'for some x, x is F and x is G' we are making tacit appeal to the idea of identity in using 'x' twice here: it has to be the same object that is both F and G.

Clarification

F and G stand for properties

Gist of Idea

In 'x is F and x is G' we must assume the identity of x in the two statements

Source

Colin McGinn (Logical Properties [2000], Ch.1)

Book Reference

McGinn,Colin: 'Logical Properties' [OUP 2003], p.8


A Reaction

This may well be broadened to any utterances whatsoever. The only remaining question is to speculate about whether it is possible to think without identities. The Hopi presumably gave identity to processes rather objects. How does God think?