Single Idea 6111

[catalogued under 7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 8. Facts / a. Facts]

Full Idea

Since any proposition can be put into a form with a subject and a predicate, united by a copula, it is natural to infer that every fact consists in the possession of a quality by a substance, which seems to me a mistake.

Clarification

'Is' is an example of a copula

Gist of Idea

As propositions can be put in subject-predicate form, we wrongly infer that facts have substance-quality form

Source

Bertrand Russell (Logical Atomism [1924], p.152)

Book Reference

Russell,Bertrand: 'Russell's Logical Atomism', ed/tr. Pears,David [Fontana 1972], p.152


A Reaction

This disagrees with McGinn on facts (Idea 6075). I approve of this warning from Russell, which is a recognition that we can't just infer our metaphysics from our language. I think of this as the 'Frege Fallacy', which ensnared Quine and others.

Related Idea

Idea 6075 Facts are object-plus-extension, or property-plus-set-of-properties, or object-plus-property [McGinn]