Single Idea 6133

[catalogued under 10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / c. Counterparts]

Full Idea

The existence of someone in another world who is a lot like me, but happier, is irrelevant to whether I - this very person - could have been happier, even if we call that other-worldly someone 'my counterpart'.

Gist of Idea

If my counterpart is happy, that is irrelevant to whether I 'could' have been happy

Source

Trenton Merricks (Objects and Persons [2003], §1.IV)

Book Reference

Merricks,Trenton: 'Objects and Persons' [OUP 2003], p.27


A Reaction

He says this is a familiar objection. I retain a lingering deterministic doubt about whether it ever makes to sense to say that I 'could' have been happy, given that I am not. It does seem to make sense to say that I was close to happiness, but missed it.