Single Idea 6221

[catalogued under 22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / f. Ultimate value]

Full Idea

If there be posited different ultimate ends, whose causes are opposed to each other, then there will be truly good actions likewise opposed to each other, which is impossible.

Gist of Idea

If there are different ultimate goods, there will be conflicting good actions, which is impossible


Richard Cumberland (De Legibus Naturae [1672], Ch.V.XVI)

Book Reference

'British Moralists 1650-1800 Vol. 1', ed/tr. Raphael,D.D. [Hackett 1991], p.99

A Reaction

A very interesting argument for there being one good rather than many, and an argument which I don't recall in any surviving Greek text. A response might be to distinguish between what is 'right' and what is 'good'. See David Ross.