Single Idea 6418

[catalogued under 11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 2. Phenomenalism]

Full Idea

Russell reverted to realism when he recognised that the notion of causality is problematic for phenomenalism; things in the world seem to affect one another causally in ways that are difficult to account for properly by mere reports of sense-experiences.

Gist of Idea

Russell rejected phenomenalism because it couldn't account for causal relations

Source

report of Bertrand Russell (The Analysis of Matter [1927]) by A.C. Grayling - Russell Ch.3

Book Reference

Grayling,A.C.: 'Russell' [OUP 1996], p.61


A Reaction

This is very interesting, and doesn't seem to have been enough to make A.J. Ayer eschew phenomenalism (Idea 5170). Once your metaphysics becomes realist (like Russell), your account of perception and objects has to change too.

Related Idea

Idea 5170 Material things are constructions from actual and possible occurrences of sense-contents [Ayer]