Single Idea 6481

[catalogued under 15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 4. Intentionality / a. Nature of intentionality]

Full Idea

Intentional states are mysterious things; if they are intrinsically about other things, what properties, if any, do they possess intrinsically?

Gist of Idea

If intentional states are intrinsically about other things, what are their own properties?

Source

Howard Robinson (Perception [1994], 1.1)

Book Reference

Robinson,Howard: 'Perception' [Routledge 2001], p.2


A Reaction

A very nice question, which I suspect to be right at the heart of the tendency towards externalist accounts of the mind. Since you can only talk about the contents of the thoughts, you can't put forward a decent internalist account of what is going on.