Single Idea 6623

[catalogued under 17. Mind and Body / C. Functionalism / 8. Functionalism critique]

Full Idea

It seems that functionalism can recognise no difference between my colour experiences and yours, in the case of spectrum inversion, suggesting that it fails to characterise colour experience adequately, by omitting its qualitative character.

Clarification

'Spectrum inversion' is where you and I experience colours differently, but don't realise it

Gist of Idea

Functionalism can't distinguish our experiences in spectrum inversion

Source

E.J. Lowe (Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind [2000], Ch. 3)

Book Reference

Lowe,E.J.: 'Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind' [CUP 2000], p.54


A Reaction

This is a standard objection to functionalism, but then it is an objection to most other theories as well. Even dualism just offers a mystery as to why experiences have qualities. Observing a patch of red involves about three billion brain connections.