Single Idea 6634

[catalogued under 17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 1. Physical Mind]

Full Idea

Physicalists will, it seems, be committed to the notion of narrow content, because if a person and their counterpart are neurological duplicates, they must exemplify the same mental state types, and thus possess beliefs with the same contents.

Gist of Idea

Physicalists must believe in narrow content (because thoughts are merely the brain states)

Source

E.J. Lowe (Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind [2000], Ch. 4)

Book Reference

Lowe,E.J.: 'Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind' [CUP 2000], p.89


A Reaction

Very important. How many philosophers currently believe in both wide content and reductive physicalism? However, if content is physical brain-plus-environment, we might reply that the whole package must be identical for same content. Cf Idea 7884!

Related Idea

Idea 7884 Most reductive accounts of representation imply broad content [Papineau]