Single Idea 6664

[catalogued under 20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 3. Acting on Reason / c. Reasons as causes]

Full Idea

It can be argued (by Davidson) that far from it being the case that reasons for and causes of action are quite distinct, reasons must be causes when agents act 'for' reasons.

Gist of Idea

Reasons must be causes when agents act 'for' reasons

Source

report of Donald Davidson (Action, Reasons and Causes [1963]) by E.J. Lowe - Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind Ch.9

Book Reference

Lowe,E.J.: 'Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind' [CUP 2000], p.259


A Reaction

Lowe argues against this view. The rival views to Davidson would be either that reasons are no more than desires-plus-beliefs in disguise, or that the will causes actions, and strong reasons carry a great weight with the will. I like the will.