Single Idea 6971

[catalogued under 22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / c. Ethical intuitionism]

Full Idea

I suspect that the experiences which some philosophers want to describe as intuitions, or a quasi-sensory apprehensions, of good are not significantly different from those that I want to describe as feelings of approval.

Gist of Idea

I would describe intuitions of good as feelings of approval

Source

A.J. Ayer (On the analysis of moral judgements [1949], p.239)

Book Reference

Ayer,A.J.: 'Philosophical Essays' [Macmillan 1965], p.239


A Reaction

This is the standard ground for rejecting intuitionism, along with the point that even if intuitions are not just feelings of approval, it seems impossible to tell the difference.