Single Idea 7009

[catalogued under 8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 2. Resemblance Nominalism]

Full Idea

My contention is that similarity among modes can do the job universals are conventionally postulated to do.


'Modes' are (roughly) tropes, which are particular instances of properties

Gist of Idea

Similarity among modes will explain everthing universals were for


John Heil (From an Ontological Point of View [2003], Intro)

Book Reference

Heil,John: 'From an Ontological Point of View' [OUP 2005], p.12

A Reaction

See Idea 4441 for Russell's nice objection to this view. The very process by which we observes similarities (as assess their degrees) needs to be explained by any adequate theory of properties or universals.

Related Idea

Idea 4441 'Resemblance Nominalism' won't work, because the theory treats resemblance itself as a universal [Russell]