Single Idea 7297

[catalogued under 13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 5. Coherentism / c. Coherentism critique]

Full Idea

My beliefs could be well justified in coherentist terms, while not accurately representing the world, and my system of beliefs could be completely free-floating.

Gist of Idea

My justifications might be very coherent, but totally unconnected to the world


Cardinal/Hayward/Jones (Epistemology [2004], Ch.3)

Book Reference

Cardinal/Hayward/Jones: 'Epistemology: the theory of knowledge' [John Murray 2004], p.79

A Reaction

This nicely encapsulates to correspondence objection to coherence theory. One thing missing from the coherence account is that beliefs aren't chosen for their coherence, but are mostly unthinkingly triggered by experiences.