Single Idea 7303

[catalogued under 11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 2. Phenomenalism]

Full Idea

The problem with taking sense-data as basic is that some data can appear indeterminate. If we can't discern the colour of someone's eyes, or the number of sides of a complex figure, are we to say that there is no fact about those things?

Gist of Idea

If we lack enough sense-data, are we to say that parts of reality are 'indeterminate'?


Cardinal/Hayward/Jones (Epistemology [2004], Ch.4)

Book Reference

Cardinal/Hayward/Jones: 'Epistemology: the theory of knowledge' [John Murray 2004], p.119

A Reaction

I like that. How many electrons are there in the sun? Such things cannot just be reduced to talk of sense-data, as there is obviously a vast gap between the data and the facts. As usual, ontology and epistemology must be kept separate.