Single Idea 7444

[catalogued under 17. Mind and Body / C. Functionalism / 4. Causal Functionalism]

Full Idea

The materialist theory Armstrong and I proposed joins claims of type-type psychophysical identity with a behaviourist or functionalist way of characterising mental states such as pain.

Gist of Idea

Type-type psychophysical identity is combined with a functional characterisation of pain

Source

David Lewis (Mad Pain and Martian Pain [1980], žIII)

Book Reference

Lewis,David: 'Philosophical Papers Vol.1' [OUP 1983], p.124


A Reaction

Armstrong has backed off from 'type-type' identity, because the realisations of a given mental state might be too diverse to be considered of the same type. Putnam's machine functionalism allows the possibility of dualism.