Single Idea 7694

[catalogued under 10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 2. Nature of Possible Worlds / c. Worlds as propositions]

Full Idea

Conventional modal semantics, in which all logically possible worlds are defined in terms of maximally consistent proposition sets, has no choice except to allow that the actual world is the world we experience in sensation, or that we inhabit.

Gist of Idea

We must experience the 'actual' world, which is defined by maximally consistent propositions


Dale Jacquette (Ontology [2002], Ch. 9)

Book Reference

Jacquette,Dale: 'Ontology' [Acumen 2002], p.79

A Reaction

Jacquette dislikes this because he is seeking an account of ontology that doesn't, as so often, merely reduce to epistemology (e.g. Berkeley). See Idea 7691 for his preferred account.

Related Idea

Idea 7691 The actual world is a consistent combination of states, made of consistent property combinations [Jacquette]