Single Idea 7695

[catalogued under 10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 2. Nature of Possible Worlds / c. Worlds as propositions]

Full Idea

Many modal logicians in their philosophical moments have raised doubts about whether structures of propositions not associated with the actual world deserved to be called worlds at all.

Gist of Idea

Do proposition-structures not associated with the actual world deserve to be called worlds?


Dale Jacquette (Ontology [2002], Ch. 2)

Book Reference

Jacquette,Dale: 'Ontology' [Acumen 2002], p.81

A Reaction

A good question. Consistency is obviously required, but we also need a lot of propositions before we would consider it a 'world'. Very remote but consistent worlds quickly become unimaginable. Does that matter?