Single Idea 7735

[catalogued under 17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 7. Anti-Physicalism / b. Multiple realisability]

Full Idea

To defend type-type identity against the multiple realisability objection, we might (also) say that while a frog's brain events for fear are functionally identical to a human's (it runs away), that doesn't mean they are phenomenally identical.

Clarification

'Phenomenally' refers to the qualia, the what's-it-like to experience something

Gist of Idea

Maybe a frog's brain events for fear are functionally like ours, but not phenomenally

Source

PG (Db (ideas) [2031])


A Reaction

I take this to be the key reply to the multiple realisability problem. If a frog flees from a loud noise, it is 'frightened' in a functional sense, but that still leaves the question 'What's it like to be a frightened frog?', which may differ from humans.