Single Idea 7743

[catalogued under 5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 2. Descriptions / c. Theory of definite descriptions]

Full Idea

Russell proposed that descriptions be treated along with the quantifiers, which departs from Frege, who treated descriptions as proper names. ...the problem was that names invoke objects, and there is no object in failed descriptions.

Gist of Idea

Russell explained descriptions with quantifiers, where Frege treated them as names

Source

report of Bertrand Russell (On Denoting [1905]) by Gregory McCullogh - The Game of the Name 2.16

Book Reference

McCulloch,Gregory: 'The Game of the Name' [OUP 1989], p.42


A Reaction

Maybe we just allow intentional objects (such as unicorns) into our ontology? Producing a parsimonious ontology seems to be the main motivation of most philosophy of language. Or maybe names are just not committed to actual existence?