Single Idea 7747

[catalogued under 5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / b. Names as descriptive]

Full Idea

It seems that a proper name could not have a reference unless it did have a sense, for how, unless the name has a sense, is it to be correlated with the object?

Gist of Idea

How can a proper name be correlated with its object if it hasn't got a sense?


John Searle (Proper Names [1958], p.91)

Book Reference

'Philosophical Logic', ed/tr. Strawson,P.F. [OUP 1973], p.91

A Reaction

This might (just) be the most important question ever asked in modern philosophy, since it provoked Kripke into answering it, by giving a social, causal, externalist account of how names (and hence lots of language) actually work. But Searle has a point.