Single Idea 7749

[catalogued under 5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / b. Names as descriptive]

Full Idea

To use a proper name referringly is to presuppose the truth of certain uniquely referring descriptive statements. ...Names are pegs on which to hang descriptions.

Gist of Idea

Reference for proper names presupposes a set of uniquely referring descriptions


John Searle (Proper Names [1958], p.94)

Book Reference

'Philosophical Logic', ed/tr. Strawson,P.F. [OUP 1973], p.94

A Reaction

This 'cluster' view of Searle's has become notorious, but I think one could at least try to mount a defence. The objection to Searle is that none of the descriptions are necessary, unlike just being the named object.