Single Idea 7760

[catalogued under 5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 2. Descriptions / a. Descriptions]

Full Idea

Donnellan objects that Russell's theory of definite descriptions overlooks the referential use (Russell writes as if all descriptions are used attributively), and that Strawson assumes they are all used referentially, to draw attention to things.

Gist of Idea

Russell only uses descriptions attributively, and Strawson only referentially

Source

report of Keith Donnellan (Reference and Definite Descriptions [1966]) by William Lycan - Philosophy of Language Ch.1

Book Reference

Lycan,William G.: 'Philosophy of Language' [Routledge 2000], p.27


A Reaction

This seems like a nice little success for analytical philosophy - clarifying a horrible mess by making a simple distinction that leaves everyone happy.