Single Idea 7773

[catalogued under 19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 8. Possible Worlds Semantics]

Full Idea

A sentence's truth conditions can be taken to be the set of possible worlds in which the sentence is true.

Gist of Idea

A sentence's truth conditions is the set of possible worlds in which the sentence is true

Source

William Lycan (Philosophy of Language [2000], Ch.10)

Book Reference

Lycan,William G.: 'Philosophy of Language' [Routledge 2000], p.150


A Reaction

Presumably the meaning can't be complete possible worlds, so this must be a supplement to the normal truth conditions view proposed by Davidson. It particularly addresses the problem seen in Idea 7770.

Related Idea

Idea 7770 Truth conditions will come out the same for sentences with 'renate' or 'cordate' [Lycan]