Single Idea 7925

[catalogued under 8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 12. Denial of Properties]

Full Idea

The lack of a proper identity concept for attributes (properties) is a lack that philosophers feel impelled to supply; for, what sense is there in saying there are attributes when there is no sense in saying when there is one attribute and when two?

Gist of Idea

There is no proper identity concept for properties, and it is hard to distinguish one from two

Source

Willard Quine (Speaking of Objects [1960], IV)

Book Reference

Quine,Willard: 'Ontological Relativity and Other Essays' [Columbia 1969], p.19


A Reaction

This strikes me as being a really crucial question. There is a mistaken tendency to take any possible linguistic predicate as implying a natural property. I sympathise with the sceptics here (see Ideas 4029, 3906, 3322). How to individuate properties?

Related Ideas

Idea 4029 Nominalists ask why we should postulate properties at all [Mellor/Oliver]

Idea 3906 If possible worlds are needed to define properties, maybe we should abandon properties [Scruton]

Idea 3322 Quine says that if second-order logic is to quantify over properties, that can be done in first-order predicate logic [Quine, by Benardete,JA]

Idea 23227 Each object has a precise number of properties, each to a precise degree [Fichte]