Single Idea 7949

[catalogued under 7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 4. Events / b. Events as primitive]

Full Idea

Davidson points out that we can only make sense of patterns of behaviour such as excuses if events can have more than one description. So I flip the light switch, turn on the light, illuminate the room, and alert a prowler, but I do only one thing.

Gist of Idea

Varied descriptions of an event will explain varied behaviour relating to it

Source

report of Donald Davidson (Action, Reasons and Causes [1963]) by Cynthia Macdonald - Varieties of Things Ch.5

Book Reference

Macdonald,Cynthia: 'Varieties of Things' [Blackwell 2005], p.185


A Reaction

We can distinguish an event as an actual object, and as an intentional object. We can probably individuate intentional events quite well (according to our interests), but actual 'events' seem to flow into one another and overlap.