Single Idea 8128

[catalogued under 12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 3. Representation]

Full Idea

McDowell has claimed that one cannot make sense of representation that plays a role in epistemology unless one takes the representation to be propositional, and thus capable of yielding reasons.

Gist of Idea

Representation must be propositional if it can give reasons and be epistemological


report of John McDowell (Mind and World [1994]) by Tyler Burge - Philosophy of Mind: 1950-2000 p.456

Book Reference

Burge,Tyler: 'Foundations of the Mind' [OUP 2007], p.456

A Reaction

A transcendental argument leads back to a somewhat implausible conclusion. I suspect that McDowell has a slightly inflated (Kantian) notion of the purity of the 'space of reasons'. Do philosophers just imagine their problems?