Single Idea 8191

[catalogued under 19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 6. Truth-Conditions Semantics]

Full Idea

It is not enough for the truth-condition theorist to argue that we need the concept of truth: he must show that we should have the same conception of truth that he has.

Gist of Idea

The truth-conditions theory must get agreement on a conception of truth

Source

Michael Dummett (Truth and the Past [2001], 2)

Book Reference

Dummett,Michael: 'Truth and the Past (Dewey Lectures)' [Columbia 2004], p.35


A Reaction

Davidson invites us to accept Tarski's account of truth. It invites the question of what the theory would be like with a very robust correspondence account of truth, or a flabby rather subjective coherence view, or the worst sort of pragmatic view.