Single Idea 8346

[catalogued under 26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / c. Conditions of causation]

Full Idea

The fuller we make the description of a cause, the better our chances of demonstrating that it was sufficient (as described) to produce the effect, and the worse our chances of demonstrating that it was necessary. (For the effect, it is the opposite).

Gist of Idea

Full descriptions can demonstrate sufficiency of cause, but not necessity

Source

Donald Davidson (Causal Relations [1967], §3)

Book Reference

Davidson,Donald: 'Essays on Actions and Events' [OUP 1982], p.157


A Reaction

If the fullness of description is relevant, this suggests that Davidson is focusing on human explanations, rather than on the ontology of causation. If the cause IS necessary, why wouldn't a better description make that clearer?