Single Idea 8358

[catalogued under 5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 1. Logical Form]

Full Idea

Neither Aristotelian nor Russellian rules give the exact logic of any expression of ordinary language; for ordinary language has no exact logic.

Gist of Idea

There are no rules for the exact logic of ordinary language, because that doesn't exist


Peter F. Strawson (On Referring [1950], 5)

Book Reference

'The Theory of Meaning', ed/tr. Parkinson,G.H.R. [OUP 1978], p.85

A Reaction

This seems to imply that it is impossible to find precise logical forms, because of the pragmatic element in language, but I don't see why. Even more extreme modern pragmatics (where meaning is shifted) doesn't rule out precise underlying propositions.