Single Idea 8358

[catalogued under 5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 1. Logical Form]

Full Idea

Neither Aristotelian nor Russellian rules give the exact logic of any expression of ordinary language; for ordinary language has no exact logic.

Gist of Idea

There are no rules for the exact logic of ordinary language, because that doesn't exist

Source

Peter F. Strawson (On Referring [1950], 5)

Book Reference

'The Theory of Meaning', ed/tr. Parkinson,G.H.R. [OUP 1978], p.85


A Reaction

This seems to imply that it is impossible to find precise logical forms, because of the pragmatic element in language, but I don't see why. Even more extreme modern pragmatics (where meaning is shifted) doesn't rule out precise underlying propositions.