Single Idea 8479

[catalogued under 8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 12. Denial of Properties]

Full Idea

Quine proposes that 'red is a colour' does not require analysis, such as 'there is an x which is the property of being red and it is a colour' which needs an ontology of properties. We can just say that all red things are coloured things.

Gist of Idea

Don't analyse 'red is a colour' as involving properties. Say 'all red things are coloured things'

Source

report of Willard Quine (works [1961]) by Alex Orenstein - W.V. Quine Ch.6

Book Reference

Orenstein,Alex: 'W.V. Quine' [Princeton 2002], p.125


A Reaction

The question of the ontology of properties is here approached, in twentieth century style, as the question 'what is the logical form of property attribution sentences?' Quine's version deals in sets of prior objects, rather than abstract entities.