Single Idea 8552

[catalogued under 8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 5. Powers and Properties]

Full Idea

The disassociation of property identity from causal potentiality is an invitation to eliminate reference to properties from our explanatory hypotheses altogether.

Gist of Idea

If properties are separated from causal powers, this invites total elimination

Source

Sydney Shoemaker (Causality and Properties [1980], §05)

Book Reference

Shoemaker,Sydney: 'Identity, Cause and Mind' [OUP 2003], p.216


A Reaction

Just as epiphenomenalism about consciousness is a step towards eliminativism. This seems to describe Quine's reaction to Goodman, in moving from predicate nominalism to elimination of properties. I agree with Shoemaker.