Single Idea 8556

[catalogued under 14. Science / C. Induction / 5. Paradoxes of Induction / a. Grue problem]

Full Idea

Grueness, as defined by Goodman, is not associated in the way greenness and blueness are with causal potentialities.

Gist of Idea

Grueness is not, unlike green and blue, associated with causal potential

Source

Sydney Shoemaker (Causality and Properties [1980], §06)

Book Reference

Shoemaker,Sydney: 'Identity, Cause and Mind' [OUP 2003], p.219


A Reaction

Expressed rather more simply in Idea 7296. 'Grue' is a characteristic production of a predicate nominalist (i.e. Goodman), and that theory is just wrong. The account of properties must mesh with the account of induction.

Related Idea

Idea 7296 'Grue' is not a colour [Milsted]