Single Idea 8584

[catalogued under 26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / c. Counterfactual causation]

Full Idea

My counterfactual analysis of causation needs counterfactuals that avoid backtracking; else the analysis faces fatal counterexamples involving epiphenomenal side-effects or cases of causal preemption.


For 'backtracking' see Idea 8578; preemption is when the other assassin shoots first

Gist of Idea

Causal counterfactuals must avoid backtracking, to avoid epiphenomena and preemption


David Lewis (New work for a theory of universals [1983], 'Laws and C')

Book Reference

'Properties', ed/tr. Mellor,D.H. /Oliver,A [OUP 1997], p.217

A Reaction

The concept of true epiphenomena (absolutely no causal powers) strikes me as bogus.