Single Idea 8855

[catalogued under 13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / c. Empirical foundations]

Full Idea

The fact that experiential contents cannot be other than they are, as far as sensory awareness goes, does not imply that we cannot misdescribe them, as in misreporting the number of speckles on a speckled hen (Chisholm's example).

Gist of Idea

Sensory experience may be fixed, but it can still be misdescribed


Michael Williams (Without Immediate Justification [2005], 4)

Book Reference

'Contemporary Debates in Epistemology', ed/tr. Steup,M/Sosa,E [Blackwell 2005], p.213

A Reaction

[Chisholm 1942 is cited] Such experiences couldn't be basic beliefs if there was a conflict between their intrinsic nature and the description I used in discussing them.