Single Idea 9204

[catalogued under 5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / f. Names eliminated]

Full Idea

Quine's logical argument against modality presupposes a naïve view of singular terms under which no significant distinction is to be drawn between the use of names and descriptions.

Gist of Idea

Quine's arguments fail because he naively conflates names with descriptions

Source

comment on Willard Quine (Two Dogmas of Empiricism [1953]) by Kit Fine - Intro to 'Modality and Tense' p. 6

Book Reference

Fine,Kit: 'Modality and Tense' [OUP 2005], p.6


A Reaction

See Idea 9201 for Quine's argument. The question is whether '9' and 'the number of planets' are names or descriptions. The 'number of planets' is not remotely descriptive of 9, so it must be referential. So '9' is a name? Hm.

Related Idea

Idea 9201 Whether 9 is necessarily greater than 7 depends on how '9' is described [Quine, by Fine,K]