Single Idea 9316

[catalogued under 15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 1. Consciousness / e. Cause of consciousness]

Full Idea

The difficulties with a self-representational view of consciousness are how self-representation of mental states could be possible, whether it leads to an infinite regress, and whether it can capture the actual phenomenology of experience.

Gist of Idea

How is self-representation possible, does it produce a regress, and is experience like that?


U Kriegel / K Williford (Intro to 'Self-Representational Consciousness' [2006], 3)

Book Reference

'Self-Representational Approaches to Consciousness', ed/tr. Kriegel,U /Williford,K [MIT 2006], p.4

A Reaction

[compressed] All of these objections strike me as persuasive, especially the first one. I'm not sure I know what self-representation is. Mirrors externally represent, and they can't represent themselves. Two mirrors together achieve something..