Single Idea 9336

[catalogued under 19. Language / B. Reference / 1. Reference theories]

Full Idea

Peacocke has a distinctive view of reference: The reference of a concept is that which will make true the primitively compelling beliefs that provide its possession conditions.

Gist of Idea

A concept's reference is what makes true the beliefs of its possession conditions

Source

report of Christopher Peacocke (A Study of Concepts [1992]) by Paul Horwich - Stipulation, Meaning and Apriority §9

Book Reference

'New Essays on the A Priori', ed/tr. Boghossian,P /Peacocke,C [OUP 2000], p.165


A Reaction

The first thought is that there might occasionally be more than one referent which would do the job. It seems to be a very internal view of reference, where I take reference to be much more contextual and social.