Single Idea 9476

[catalogued under 8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 2. Powers as Basic]

Full Idea

Maybe a disposition is a more fundamental notion than a cause, in which case Lewis has from the very start erred in seeking a causal analysis, in a traditional, conceptual sense, of disposition terms.

Gist of Idea

If dispositions are more fundamental than causes, then they won't conceptually reduce to them


comment on David Lewis (Causation [1973]) by Alexander Bird - Nature's Metaphysics 2.2.8

Book Reference

Bird,Alexander: 'Nature's Metaphysics' [OUP 2007], p.37

A Reaction

Is this right about Lewis? I see him as reducing both dispositions and causes to a set of bald facts, which exist in possible and actual worlds. Conditionals and counterfactuals also suffer the same fate.