Single Idea 9486

[catalogued under 8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 3. Instantiated Universals]

Full Idea

An instantiation condition seems to be a failure of nerve as regards realism about universals. If universals really are entities in their own right, why should their existence depend upon a relationship with existing particulars?

Gist of Idea

Why should a universal's existence depend on instantiation in an existing particular?

Source

Alexander Bird (Nature's Metaphysics [2007], 3.2.2)

Book Reference

Bird,Alexander: 'Nature's Metaphysics' [OUP 2007], p.55


A Reaction

I like this challenge, which seems to leave fans of universals no option but full-blown Platonism, which most of them recognise as being deeply implausible.