Single Idea 9870

[catalogued under 18. Thought / D. Concepts / 1. Concepts / a. Nature of concepts]

Full Idea

In the 'Grundlagen' Frege takes the notion of the extension of a concept for granted as unproblematic.

Clarification

The 'extension' is the objects to which it applies

Gist of Idea

Early Frege takes the extensions of concepts for granted

Source

report of Gottlob Frege (Grundlagen der Arithmetik (Foundations) [1884]) by Michael Dummett - Frege philosophy of mathematics Ch.16

Book Reference

Dummett,Michael: 'Frege: philosophy of mathematics' [Duckworth 1991], p.200


A Reaction

This comfortable notion was undermined by Russell's discovery of a concept which couldn't have an extension. Maybe we could defeat the Russell problem (and return to Frege's common sense) by denying that sets are objects.