Single Idea 9948

[catalogued under 18. Thought / D. Concepts / 4. Structure of Concepts / a. Conceptual structure]

Full Idea

For Frege, concepts differ from objects in being inherently incomplete in nature.

Gist of Idea

Unlike objects, concepts are inherently incomplete

Source

report of Gottlob Frege (Function and Concept [1891]) by A.George / D.J.Velleman - Philosophies of Mathematics Ch.2

Book Reference

George,A/Velleman D.J.: 'Philosophies of Mathematics' [Blackwell 2002], p.20


A Reaction

This is because they are 'unsaturated', needing a quantified variable to complete the sentence. This could be a pointer towards Quine's view of properties, as simply an intrinsic feature of predication about objects, with no separate identity.