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Full Idea
Armstrong conflates the type-token distinction with that between universals and particulars.
Gist of Idea
The type-token distinction is the universal-particular distinction
Source
report of David M. Armstrong (A Theory of Universals [1978], xiii,16/17) by Harold Hodes - Logicism and Ontological Commits. of Arithmetic 147 n23
Book Ref
-: 'Journal of Philosophy' [-], p.147
A Reaction
This seems quite reasonable, even if you don’t believe in the reality of universals. I'm beginning to think we should just use the term 'general' instead of 'universal'. 'Type' also seems to correspond to 'set', with the 'token' as the 'member'.
17848 | Things such as two different quadrangles are alike but not wholly the same [Aristotle] |
10024 | The type-token distinction is the universal-particular distinction [Armstrong, by Hodes] |
13945 | A token isn't a unique occurrence, as the case of a word or a number shows [Cartwright,R] |
6043 | Type-identity is close similarity in qualities [McGinn] |
6044 | Qualitative identity is really numerical identity of properties [McGinn] |
6046 | Qualitative identity can be analysed into numerical identity of the type involved [McGinn] |
6045 | It is best to drop types of identity, and speak of 'identity' or 'resemblance' [McGinn] |
8290 | One view is that two objects of the same type are only distinguished by differing in matter [Lowe] |
13920 | Each thing has to be of a general kind, because it belongs to some category [Lowe] |
6157 | Tokens are dated, concrete particulars; types are their general properties or kinds [Rowlands] |
4647 | 'I have the same car as you' is fine; 'I have the same fiancée as you' is not so good [Baggini /Fosl] |