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Single Idea 10246

[filed under theme 26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / e. Anti scientific essentialism ]

Full Idea

A science can determine its domain of investigation up to an isomorphic mapping. It remains quite indifferent as to the 'essence' of its objects. The idea of isomorphism demarcates the self-evident boundary of cognition.

Clarification

'Isomorphism' is when theories map onto one another

Gist of Idea

The limit of science is isomorphism of theories, with essences a matter of indifference

Source

Hermann Weyl (Phil of Mathematics and Natural Science [1949], 25-7), quoted by Stewart Shapiro - Philosophy of Mathematics

Book Ref

Shapiro,Stewart: 'Philosophy of Mathematics:structure and ontology' [OUP 1997], p.160


A Reaction

Shapiro quotes this in support of his structuralism, but it is a striking expression of the idea that if there are such things as essences, they are beyond science. I take Weyl to be wrong. Best explanation reaches out beyond models to essences.


The 17 ideas with the same theme [objections to essences in scientific investigation]:

The cosmos has two elements - passive matter, and active cause (or reason) which shapes it [Stoic school, by Seneca]
The motions of the planets could only derive from an intelligent agent [Newton]
That gravity should be innate and essential to matter is absurd [Newton]
If properties and qualities arise from an inward essence, we will remain ignorant of nature [Berkeley]
We can never know origins, purposes or inner natures [Comte]
The limit of science is isomorphism of theories, with essences a matter of indifference [Weyl]
We can't say 'necessarily if x is in water then x dissolves' if we can't quantify modally [Quine]
Essence gives an illusion of understanding [Quine, by Almog]
Essentialist views of science prevent further questions from being raised [Popper]
How can essences generate the right powers to vary with distance between objects? [Armstrong]
H2O isn't necessary, because different laws of nature might affect how O and H combine [Lowe]
The reductionism found in scientific essentialism is mistaken [Oderberg]
Dispositional essentialism can't explain its key distinction between essential and non-essential properties [Psillos]
Can anything in science reveal the necessity of what it discovers? [Sidelle]
A major objection to real essences is the essentialising of social categories like race, caste and occupation [Gelman]
Defining an essence comes no where near giving a thing's nature [Almog]
Essences promise to reveal reality, but actually drive us away from it [Almog]