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Single Idea 10267

[filed under theme 5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 6. Plural Quantification ]

Full Idea

Standard second-order existential quantifiers pick out a class or a property, but Boolos suggests that they be understood as a plural quantifier, like 'there are objects' or 'there are people'.

Gist of Idea

We should understand second-order existential quantifiers as plural quantifiers

Source

report of George Boolos (To be is to be the value of a variable.. [1984]) by Stewart Shapiro - Philosophy of Mathematics 7.4

Book Ref

Shapiro,Stewart: 'Philosophy of Mathematics:structure and ontology' [OUP 1997], p.234

A Reaction

This idea has potential application to mathematics, and Lewis (1991, 1993) 'invokes it to develop an eliminative structuralism' (Shapiro).

The 24 ideas with the same theme [quantifiers pick out collections, not just 'one+' or 'all']:

14236 Each horse doesn't fall under the concept 'horse that draws the carriage', because all four are needed [Oliver/Smiley on Frege]
12798 Plurals can in principle be paraphrased away altogether [Quine]
14235 Saying 'they can become a set' is a tautology, because reference to 'they' implies a collection [Cargile]
10267 We should understand second-order existential quantifiers as plural quantifiers [Boolos, by Shapiro]
10698 Plural forms have no more ontological commitment than to first-order objects [Boolos]
15731 Quantification sometimes commits to 'sets', but sometimes just to pluralities (or 'classes') [Lewis]
15518 I like plural quantification, but am not convinced of its connection with second-order logic [Lewis]
15525 Plural quantification lacks a complete axiom system [Lewis]
10268 Maybe plural quantifiers should be understood in terms of classes or sets [Shapiro]
12845 Some natural languages don't distinguish between singular and plural [Simons]
10635 Second-order quantification and plural quantification are different [Linnebo]
10636 Plural plurals are unnatural and need a first-level ontology [Linnebo]
10639 Plural quantification may allow a monadic second-order theory with first-order ontology [Linnebo]
10640 Instead of complex objects like tables, plurally quantify over mereological atoms tablewise [Linnebo]
10641 Traditionally we eliminate plurals by quantifying over sets [Linnebo]
10778 Can second-order logic be ontologically first-order, with all the benefits of second-order? [Linnebo]
10783 Plural quantification depends too heavily on combinatorial and set-theoretic considerations [Linnebo]
14234 If you only refer to objects one at a time, you need sets in order to refer to a plurality [Oliver/Smiley]
14237 We can use plural language to refer to the set theory domain, to avoid calling it a 'set' [Oliver/Smiley]
12794 Plurals are semantical but not ontological [Laycock]
10666 Plural reference will refer to complex facts without postulating complex things [Hossack]
10669 Plural reference is just an abbreviation when properties are distributive, but not otherwise [Hossack]
10675 A plural comprehension principle says there are some things one of which meets some condition [Hossack]
14232 We normally formalise 'There are Fs' with singular quantification and predication, but this may be wrong [Liggins]